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Evolutionary Predictions Should be Based on Individual-Level Traits
Claus Rueﬄer1,2, Martijn Egas3 and Johan A. J. Metz1,4,5
ABSTRACT
A recent series of theoretical studies have analyzed the evolution of habitat special-
ization using either the logistic or the Ricker equation. These studies have implemented
evolutionary change directly in population-level parameters such as habitat-specific in-
trinsic growth rates r or carrying capacities K. This approach is a shortcut to a more
detailed analysis where evolutionary change is studied in underlying morphological,
physiological or behavioral traits at the level of the individual that contribute to r or K.
Here we describe two pitfalls that can occur when such a shortcut is employed. Firstly,
population-level parameters that appear as independent variables in a population dy-
namical model might not be independent when derived from processes at the individual
level. Secondly, patterns of covariation between individual-level traits are usually not
conserved when mapped to the level of demographic parameters. Nonlinear mappings
constrain the curvature of trade-offs that can sensibly be assumed at the population
level. To illustrate these results we derive a two-habitat version of the logistic and the
Ricker equation from individual-level processes and compare the evolutionary dynamics
of habitat-specific carrying capacities with those of underlying individual-level traits
contributing to the carrying capacities. Finally, we sketch how our viewpoint affects
the results of earlier theoretical studies.
Subject headings: development, logistic equation, optimization, Ricker equation, spe-
cialization, trade-off
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Introduction
Long term evolution by mutation and selection is largely driven by invasion of novel genotypes
into resident populations. Invasion is a population dynamical process and, when evolution is stud-
ied by means of mathematical models, therefore has to be inferred from a population dynamical
model. In the recent literature several studies have appeared that analyze the evolution of habitat
specialization using either the Ricker equation (Wilson and Yoshimura 1994; Egas et al. 2004) or
the logistic equation (Parvinen and Egas 2004; de Mazancourt and Dieckmann 2004) to describe
habitat-specific population growth. In these models habitat specialization is subject to a trade-
off, such that a high value in the carrying capacity or the intrinsic growth rate in one habitat is
bought at the expense of a low carrying capacity or growth rate in the other habitat. Evolution
and coexistence are then studied by assuming variation in the degree of habitat-specialization in
terms of either r or K. These parameters have an interpretation only at the level of populations
while mutations causing evolutionary change occur at the level of the individual. Therefore the
models mentioned above employ a shortcut because a description of how variation at the level of the
individual is linked to variation in population-level parameters is skipped. Such a shortcut is only
permissible when the assumed patterns of variation at the level of the demographic parameters can
be derived from variation in underlying individual-level traits, an issue that can only be evaluated
with models that are based on an explicit mapping from processes at the level of individuals to
population-level parameters.
Although our study is motivated by the specific problem introduced above, the issue at hand
is of a much more general nature. Genetic variation occurs at the level of DNA sequences and ulti-
mately affects the make-up of a population. The step from individual sequences to population-level
characteristics can be described by a cascade of mappings. Genotypes are mapped to enzymes and
their regulation. During development these characteristics might be mapped to, e.g., morphomet-
rical properties of the beak of a bird, which determine its handling times for different seeds, which
determines energy uptake, which determines offspring production, which determines population
growth rate. The general question then becomes how patterns of variation and covariation at one
level are mapped to the next level.
The aim of this paper is to show how an explicit mapping from individual-level traits to
population-level parameters can help us to understand how evolution is likely to work by informing
us about how patterns of variation and covariation at lower levels can constrain resulting patterns
of variation at higher levels. In the following section we discuss two pitfalls that con occur when
an explicit description of the mapping from individual-level traits to demographic parameters is
skipped. We then continue by illustrating these issues by means of two examples and conclude by
sketching how our viewpoint affects the results of the above mentioned studies.
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Population-Level Parameters Derive From Underlying Traits at the Level of the
Individual
In this section we use the logistic equation to illustrate two separate issues that emerge when
patterns of variation and covariation at the level of population-level demographic parameters are
derived from variation in underlying individual-level traits.
The logistic equation is given by
1
N
dN
dt
= r
(
1−
N
K
)
, (1)
where N denotes population density, r the intrinsic rate of increase and K the carrying capacity.
The logistic equation is widely used to describe density-dependent population growth of a single
species with only two parameters. The fact that r and K do not have an interpretation at the
level of the individual has triggered a series of derivations from first principles at the level of the
individual. Such derivations either assume density dependence in the birth rate b (MacArthur
(1972, p. 56), Schoener (1973), Edelstein-Keshet (1988, p. 119), see also Kooi et al. (1998)) or in
the death rate d (Gyllenberg 2005). For derivations that do not describe the dynamics of individuals
but the fraction of either inhabited patches in a meta-population or of infected individuals in a
population of susceptible and infected individuals see Hanski (1999, p. 56) and Diekmann and
Heesterbeek (2000, p. 212), respectively. The derivations that assume a density-dependent birth
rate have a limited scope because they predict a negative birth rate when the population size passes
some threshold and we do not consider these derivations any further. All derivations that assume
a density-dependent death rate implement the idea that the death rate is linearly increasing with
population density:
1
N
dN
dt
= b− (d+ αN) = (b− d)
(
1−
α
b− d
N
)
, (2)
where the biological interpretation of the positive proportionality constant α depends on the specific
derivation. From comparing equation (2) with equation (1) we see that r = b−d and K = (b−d)/α.
Based on these derivations two observations can be made. Firstly, K depends linearly on
those traits that underly r and any variation that affects r causes K to vary proportionally. Thus,
seemingly independent parameters at one level are not necessarily independent when they are
derived from an underlying level. A conclusion from the above derivation is that models that use
the logistic equation as a building block and that assume variation in r while K is kept constant
(e.g. Parvinen and Egas 2004) do not have an interpretation at the level of the individual. We do
not claim that it is impossible to construct a derivation of the logistic equation from first principles
such that a individual-level trait exists that contributes to r but not to K. But even in this case
independent variation of r can only be motivated if genetic variation is likely to contribute only to
those traits that do not affect K.
Secondly, K can change independently of r only through a change in α. This parameter is
inversely related to K, hence, any change in α affects K in a non-linear way. This observation
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becomes important when the evolutionary dynamics of correlated traits is studied. Assume a
situation where an organism occupies two different habitats that require different adaptations and
that population growth in each habitat can be described by the logistic equation (eq. 2). In
this situation it is likely that a constraint exists that prevents a genotype from being optimally
adapted to both habitats simultaneously. Here we adopt the viewpoint that such a constraint can
be visualized as the outer boundary of the set of possible phenotypes to which we will refer as
trade-off curve (fig. 1). Assume further that adaptations to the habitats occur in the traits α1 and
α2. Since population growth is increasing with decreasing values of αi (eq. 2), selection will push a
population’s trait distribution from high values of αi towards lower values until the trade-off is hit.
From then onward selection will keep the phenotype distribution close to the trade-off relative to
the mutational step size. Patterns of covariation within a population will then depend on the shape
of the outer boundary of the set of possible phenotypes and different trade-off curves correspond
to different such boundaries. Arnold (1992) refers to this scenario as the Charnov-Charlesworth
model for equilibrium genetic covariance for a single pair of traits (cf. Charnov 1989; Charlesworth
1990). The pattern of covariation in individual-level traits causes specific patterns of covariation
at the level of demographic parameters (fig. 1). In our example phenotypes are mapped from the
(α1, α2)-space to the (K1,K2)-space by (K1,K2) = ((b1 − d1)/α1, (b2 − d2)/α2). In the same way
we can map the trade-off curve from one level to the next. The result of this mapping is shown in
figure 1. Note that the phenotype distribution in the (K1,K2)-space lies below and to the left of
the trade-off because population growth is increasing with increasing values of Ki.
The important message from this example is that properties of the phenotype distribution
and the trade-off are not necessarily conserved when mapped from one level to the other. The
phenotypes indicated by the dots in the (α1, α2)-space in figure 1 show relative low values of αi
for both habitats. The corresponding trade-off is called “weak” because the habitat generalist
is only slightly inferior in each habitat when compared to the habitat specialists. On the other
hand, phenotypes in the (K1,K2)-space show relative low carrying capacities in both habitats. In
this case the the trade-off is called “strong” because habitat generalists are strongly inferior in
each habitat in terms of their carrying capacity when compared to the corresponding specialist.
From this observation two questions emerge. Firstly, can an a priori chosen curve for the trade-off
between K1 and K2 be derived from a curve in the underlying constraint that connects α1 and α2?
Secondly, assume that the answer to the first question is ‘yes’, how biologically plausible is it to
assume the type of curve for the trade-off between α1 and α2 that maps to the a priori chosen curve
for the trade-off between K1 and K2? In the following examples we will show that in some cases a
weak trade-off between habitat-specific carrying capacities cannot be derived from any underlying
trade-off and that in other cases specific curves for the trade-off at the higher level can only be
realized by assuming rather extreme curvatures for the trade-off at the underlying level.
Before we continue to illustrate our point we want to point out that the very same two obser-
vations can be made for the Ricker equation Nt+1/Nt = exp[r(1 −Nt/K)]. For derivations of the
Ricker equation from first principles see Royama (1992), Gatto (1993), Gurney and Nisbet (1998),
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Sumpter and Broomhead (2001), Thieme (2003), Geritz and Kisdi (2004), and Bra¨nnstro¨m and
Sumpter (2005).
Two Examples
We want to illustrate by means of two examples how patterns of covariation between de-
mographic parameters can be derived from an explicit model of individual-level processes that
contribute to the demographic parameters. Our examples are strongly inspired by the models of
Wilson and Yoshimura (1994), Egas et al. (2004), Parvinen and Egas (2004) and de Mazancourt and
Dieckmann (2004). In this section we develop a two-habitat version of the logistic and the Ricker
equation from first principles. This provides us with explicit expressions for the carrying capacity
in terms of individual-level traits. We then investigate how specific trade-off curvatures underlying
traits that contribute to carrying capacity affect the curvature of the resulting trade-off between
habitat specific carrying capacities. These results are shown in the following section. In the final
section before the discussion we show how evolutionary predictions can differ when evolutionary
change is directly assumed in the carrying capacities when compared to trade-offs in underlying
individual-level traits.
Continuous Time: Fast Migration Between Habitats
Assume that individuals migrate at a high rate between habitats and that travel time is
negligible. This means that the environment is fine-grained. Under the assumption that birth and
death rates are small compared to the migration rates, we calculate the probability for an individual
to be in habitat one, p1, or to be in habitat two, p2 = 1−p1 in appendix A. Furthermore, we assume
that birth and death processes are determined instantaneously, that is, whether an individual dies
or gives birth at a certain moment in time, purely depends on its current habitat. If population
growth within each habitat can be described by the logistic equation (eq. 1), then the population
dynamics is given by
dN
dt
= N
[
p1r1
(
1−
p1N
K1
)
+ p2r2
(
1−
p2N
K2
)]
, (3)
with ri and Ki the habitat-specific intrinsic growth rates and carrying capacities, respectively. The
dynamics has a single, nontrivial, stable equilibrium at
Nˆ =
(p1r1 + p2r2)K1K2
p2
1
r1K2 + p22r2K1
. (4)
In order to give the parameters ri and Ki an interpretation at the level of the individual, we
present in appendix A one possible derivation of equation (3) based on individual-level processes.
This derivation is inspired by Royama’s derivation of the Ricker equation (1992, pp. 144, see
following section). We assume that individuals die at some minimum rate when they can exploit a
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competition neighborhood of size a on their own. The size of this neighborhood is determined by
a variety of biological properties like the conversion efficiency of food into energy or the efficiency
with which resources are gathered. The minimum death rate increases incrementally by l, a positive
constant, with each additional conspecific that enters the competition neighborhood of the focal
individual. For a single habitat this mechanism yields
dN
dt
= N(b− d)
(
1−
la
b− d
N
)
, (5)
where b and d are the density independent birth and death rate, respectively. Equation (5) cor-
responds to equation (2), but now the demographic parameters r and K have an interpretation
in terms of individual-level traits: r = b − d and K = (b − d)/la. This description holds for each
habitat so that ri = bi − di and Ki = (bi − di)/liai. If we insert these descriptions into equation
(3), we get the following two-habitat version:
dN
dt
= N
[
p1(b1 − d1)
(
1−
l1a1
b1 − d1
p1N
)
+ p2(b2 − d2)
(
1−
l2a2
b2 − d2
p2N
)]
. (6)
Discrete Time: Juvenile Dispersal
Here we assume that generations are discrete and non-overlapping. At birth individuals are
randomly distributed over two habitats with probabilities p1 and p2 = 1− p1. These probabilities
are proportional to the relative size of the two habitats and independent of the habitat of birth. The
latter is the case either because of very effective dispersal or due to a fine-grained environment. Once
settled individuals stay within their habitat until death. In case of a fine-grained environment this
implies that organisms are sessile. If we assume that the population dynamics within each habitat
can be described by the Ricker equation (Ricker 1952), then population growth is given by:
Nt+1 = Nt
[
p1 exp
(
r1
(
1−
p1Nt
K1
))
+ p2 exp
(
r2
(
1−
p2Nt
K2
))]
. (7)
Only in case of symmetric parameter values r1 = r = r2,K1 = K = K2 and p1 = 0.5 = p2 can
we calculate the equilibrium population size analytically as Nˆ = 2K. The population dynamics
of this case are well understood. The equilibrium Nˆ = 2K is stable for r < 2, larger value of r
lead to cycles and eventually chaotic dynamics (May and Oster 1976). Here we restrict ourselves
to parameter values that produce stable equilibria.
In order to get an individual-level interpretation of equation (7) we again follow Royama
(1992, pp. 144). Royama assumes that the offspring number an individual produces, Rn, decreases
exponentially with the number of conspecifics n within a competition neighborhood of size a:
Rn = R0k
n. The sensitivity parameter k is a positive constant smaller than one. For the case that
individuals are Poisson distributed over the habitat, Royama (1992) shows that
Nt+1 = Nt exp
(
logR0
(
1−
a(1− k)
logR0
Nt
))
. (8)
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This is the Ricker equation where r = logR0 and K = logR0/(a(1 − k)). By combining equation
(8) with equation (7), we get a two-habitat version of the Ricker equation:
Nt+1 = Nt
[
p1 exp
(
logR01
(
1−
a1(1− k1)
logR01
p1Nt
))
+p2 exp
(
logR02
(
1−
a2(1− k2)
logR02
p2Nt
))]
(9)
The Mapping of Trade-Offs
The preceding section provides us with an individual-based interpretation the population-level
parameters K1 and K2:
Ki =
bi − di
aili
ri = bi − di logistic equation (10)
Ki =
logR0i
ai(1− ki)
ri = logR0i Ricker equation. (11)
We now investigate how a trade-off between the habitat specific carrying capacities can be
derived from a trade-off in traits at the level of the individual. Here we assume that mutational
change occurs for the size of the competition neighborhoods a1 and a2 and that these traits are
coupled by a trade-off, which can be written as a function a2(a1) with da2/da1 < 0. All other traits
are assumed to be fixed parameters. We choose a1 and a2 because they can, at least in principle,
be measured at the level of the individual and because they influence the carrying capacities in
the logistic and the Ricker equation in the same way, which facilitates a comparison between these
models. From now on we refer to a trade-off between a1 and a2 as a trade-off in a, and similarly,
to a trade-off between K1 and K2 as a trade-off in K.
Next we introduce specific trade-off parameterizations for a2(a1) and K2(K1). This allows us
to visualize how a trade-off in a maps onto a trade-off in K, or, vice versa, what trade-off in a is
implicitly assumed when a specific trade-off in K is chosen. Our parameterizations generalize the
trade-off function used by Egas et al. (2004) and Parvinen and Egas (2004).
a = (a1, a2) =
(
a1max − a1var(1− θ)
1
z , a2max − a2varθ
1
z
)
(12)
K = (K1,K2) =
(
K1min +K1var(1− θ)
1
z ,K2min +K2varθ
1
z
)
(13)
Here a1max, a1var, a2max, a2var,K1min,K1var,K2min,K2var are positive constants determining the range
of possible parameter values while the positive parameter z determines the curvature of the trade-off
curve.
Note the following difference between the two trade-off parameterizations. In equation (12)
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θ = 0 corresponds to a low value of a1 and to a high value of a2. In equation (13) the opposite holds
true, θ = 0 corresponds to a high value of K1 and to a low value of K2. Since population growth is
decreasing in ai (eq. 6 and eq. 9) but increasing inKi (eq. 3 and eq. 7) this means that in both cases
θ = 0 corresponds to a specialist for habitat one while θ = 1 corresponds to a specialist for habitat
two. A similar pattern applies to the curvature of the trade-off and the corresponding curvature
parameter z (fig. 2). Values of z < 1 correspond to a concave trade-off in a (d2a2/da
2
1 < 0) and
to a convex trade-off in K (d2K2/dK
2
1 > 0). The opposite pattern holds for z > 1. Hence, these
parameterizations are such that z < 1 corresponds to a strong trade-off and z > 1 corresponds to
a weak trade-off in both a and K. This terminology is motivated by the following observation.
In case of symmetric values for aimax, aivar,Kimin, and Kivar all phenotypes that lie on a linear
trade-off (z = 1) have exactly the same value for a and K, respectively, when averaged over both
habitats. On a convex trade-off a generalist has a lower competition neighborhood size (eq. 12)
and a lower carrying capacity (eq. 13) than a specialist when averaged over both habitats. Such a
generalist is superior over the specialists in terms of its average competition neighborhood size but
inferior in terms of its average carrying capacity. The opposite pattern holds for concave trade-offs.
How does the function a2(a1) mediates the trade-off in K? To see this we have to combine
equation (10) and (12). The result is shown in figure 2a&b. Note that the curvature of the derived
trade-off in K can change from convex to concave along a single trade-off curve (see fig. 2b, right
panel). In the following we refer to the curvature around the generalist’s trait with θ = 0.5. In
figure 2a the trait space encompasses values of ai between 0.1 and 0.2 (aimax = 0.2, aivar = 0.1)
while in figure 2b the trait space encompasses values between 0.1 and 1 (aimax = 1, aivar = 0.9). In
the first case all trade-offs in a corresponding to z < 2 are mapped into a strong trade-off in K.
In other words, for trade-offs in a with 1 < z < 2, that is, for moderately weak trade-offs, their
weakness is not inherited. In the second case, only extremely weak trade-offs in a corresponding
to z >≈ 12 are mapped onto weak trade-offs in K. For trade-offs with 1 < z < 12, the weakness
is not inherited. Hence, weak trade-offs in a are mapped to strong trade-offs in K for z-values
below some threshold. In appendix B we show that this threshold increases with increasing values
of aivar. In the limit of aivar = 0 the threshold becomes one and the curvature property is always
inherited. In the limit of aivar =∞ the threshold becomes infinity, hence, any trade-off in a, weak
or strong, is mapped to a strong trade-off in K.
Models assuming a trade-off directly at the level of the carrying capacities make an implicit
assumption about the shape of the trade-off in an individual-level trait. This implicit assumption
can be laid bare by applying the inverse mapping, from the trade-off in the carrying capacities K
to the trade-off in a. The result of this exercise is shown in figure 2c&d.
Evolutionary Dynamics
Analyses of long term evolution should be based on an invasion argument: Can a rare mutant
type increase in frequency or is it doomed to extinction? This is determined by its invasion fitness
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s, its long term average growth rate when rare in an environment determined by a given resident
type (e.g., Metz et al. 1992). If s > 0, then such a mutant has a positive probability to invade
the resident population and if s < 0 such a mutant will disappear. Under certain conditions an
invasion analysis is equivalent to solving an optimization criterion (Metz et al. 1996). The quantity
that is maximized by evolution cannot be chosen a priori but has to be derived from an invasion
argument (Mylius and Diekmann 1995). For our examples we are able to show that equilibrium
population size Nˆ serves as an optimization criterion. Populations with trait values that correspond
to a higher equilibrium population size Nˆ replace populations with lower equilibrium population
size and and trait values that maximize population size are potential endpoints of evolution. These
trait values are both attractors of the evolutionary dynamics and are uninvadable by individuals
with other trait values. Eshel (1983) coined the term continuously stable strategies (CSSs) for such
trait values. Trait values that correspond to minima of Nˆ are evolutionary repellors from where
the evolutionary dynamics moves away. The existence of an optimization criterion allows us to
visualize the evolutionary process using Levins’ fitness set approach (Levins 1962; Rueﬄer et al.
2004). In this graphical method the trade-off curve is plotted on top of the contour lines of the
fitness landscape given by Nˆ (fig. 4). Evolutionary endpoints are those phenotypes on the trade-off
curve that lie on the highest fitness contour line.
Fast Migration Between Habitats
First we consider the case where evolutionary change is assumed to directly affect K1 and K2.
Invasion fitness of a mutant type K′ = (K ′1,K
′
2) in a resident population with carrying capacities
K = (K1,K2) can be derived from equation (3) as
s(K′,K) = p1r1 + p2r2 − Nˆ(K)
(
p21r1
K ′
1
+
p22r2
K ′
2
)
. (14)
Equation (14) is obviously monotonically decreasing in Nˆ (eq. 4). As mentioned above, this is a
sufficient condition for the equilibrium population size to be an optimization criterion (Mylius and
Diekmann 1995). Figure 4a shows the numerically calculated location of the minima and maxima
of the optimization criterion as a function of the curvature parameter z for one specific set of
symmetric parameter values. For weak trade-offs the habitat generalist with K1 = K2 maximizes
equilibrium population size Nˆ and is therefore a CSS. The habitat generalist remains to be a CSS
for moderately strong trade-offs and it is only for very strong trade-offs with z < 0.35 that the
generalist turns into an evolutionary repellor (fig. 4).
In appendix C we show that whether the habitat generalist with K1 = K2 constitutes a
minimum or a maximum of Nˆ also depends on the parameters Kimin and Kivar, i.e., on the range of
possible parameter values for Ki. Small values of Kimin favor the generalist even for z < 1 (strong
trade-offs) while with small values of Kivar a situation is approached where weak trade-offs select
for a generalist while strong trade-offs select for specialists.
Does the evolutionary dynamics change when we implement evolutionary change in individual-
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level traits? Invasion fitness of a rare mutant type with competition neighborhood size a′ = (a′1, a
′
2)
in a population with a = (a1, a2) can be derived from equation (6) as
s(a′,a) = p1r1 + p2r2 − Nˆ(a)(p
2
1a
′
1l1 + p
2
2a
′
2l2), (15)
where ri = bi − di. As in the previous version, fitness is a monotonically decreasing function of
Nˆ , which therefore qualifies as a optimization criterion. From equation (4) we can derive that
Nˆ = (p1r1 + p2r2)/(p
2
1a1l1 + p
2
2a2l2). Differentiation of Nˆ reveals that critical points are given by
da2/da1 = −p
2
1l1/(p
2
2l2) and that the sign of the second derivative equals the sign of −d
2a2/da
2
1.
Hence, critical points of Nˆ are maxima for z > 1 (weak trade-offs) and minima for z < 1 (strong
trade-offs). For z = 1 all trait combinations are selectively neutral. Figure 4b depicts this results
for the case of symmetric parameter values. A comparison of figure 3a and 3b shows that the
range of z-values that favor habitat generalists over specialists is considerably smaller when the
trade-off is implemented between a1 and a2. This indicates that in this case the shortcut of
directly implementing a trade-off in demographic parameters overestimates the likelihood of finding
generalists.
It is illuminating to plot these results in terms of fitness sets (Levins 1962). The fitness land-
scape, that is, the optimization criterion, can be plotted either as a function of the demographic
parameters K1 and K2 (fig. 4a&c) or as a function of the underlying individual-level traits a1 and
a2 (fig. 4b). In the first case the contours of the fitness landscape are given by those values of K1
and K2 that result in equal values c of the optimization criterion Nˆ . These Ki-values lie on convex
hyperbolas given by K2 = cp
2
2r2K1/(K1 − cp
2
1r1). In the second case the contours of the fitness
landscape are straight lines with a negative slope given by a2 = (1 − cp
2
1a1l1)/(cp
2
2l2). In a next
step we plot different trade-off curves on top of the contour plot of the fitness landscape. In figure
4a this is done for trade-offs in K and in 4b for trade-offs in a. In figure 4c this is done again
for a trade-off in K, but now the trade-off is derived from the underlying trade-off in a. From
figure 4a we see that fitness landscapes with convex fitness contours favor generalists and it is only
for very strong trade-offs (e.g., z = 1/4) that specialists do better (cf. fig. 3a). In the presence
of a fitness landscape with linear contours (fig. 4b) weak trade-offs favor generalists and strong
trade-offs favor specialists (cf. fig. 3b). Figure 4c shows that optimization in terms of K and a are
equivalent approaches as long as the trade-off inK is derived from an underlying trade-off in a. In
both case the trade-off curve given by z = 1 exactly follows a contour line of the fitness landscape
which accounts for the evolutionary neutrality of all traits.
Juvenile Dispersal
Fitness in discrete time models can be expressed more easily as w = exp(s). If w > 1, a
mutant is able to invade while a mutant with w < 1 cannot invade. As in the previous section
we first perform an evolutionary analysis under the assumption that K1 and K2 are traded-off
directly followed by an analysis where evolutionary change is implemented in the size of the two
competition neighborhoods a1 and a2. In both cases the fitness function is monotonically decreasing
in Nˆ , which therefore again qualifies as an optimization criterion (Mylius and Diekmann 1995).
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Unfortunately, we can only calculate Nˆ analytically for the case of symmetric parameter values
and a consumer that is equally specialized for both habitats. Hence, the maximization of Nˆ has to
be done numerically.
For the first case where the trade-off is directly assumed in K we find the following fitness
function:
w(K ′,K) = p1 exp
(
r1
(
1−
p1Nˆ(K)
K ′
1
))
+ p2 exp
(
r2
(
1−
p2Nˆ(K)
K ′
2
))
. (16)
Numerical analysis of the optimization criterion Nˆ reveals a pitchfork bifurcation of θ-values that
correspond to extrema in Nˆ (fig. 3c). For small values of z (strong trade-offs) the generalist is an
evolutionary repellor. The generalist turns into a CSS when some threshold value of z is passed. For
r < 2, i.e., for stable population dynamical equilibria, we prove in appendix C that this threshold
always has a value smaller than one.
In the second case where the trade-off is assumed between the underlying traits a1 and a2
invasion fitness is given by
w(a′,a) = p1 exp
[
r1
(
1−
p1Nˆ(a)a
′
1(1− k1)
r1
)]
+ p2 exp
[
r2
(
1−
p2Nˆ(a)a
′
2(1− k2)
r2
)]
. (17)
By numerical calculations we find again a pitchfork bifurcation (fig. 3d). For this case we can
prove (app. C) that the change from a repelling generalist strategy to a generalist which is a CSS
takes place for some z-value larger than one (for a weak trade-off). In appendix C we also show
that the bifurcation point moves towards higher z-values with increasing population growth rate r.
This means that fast growth favors habitat specialization. Figure 4d-f illustrate these results with
the use of fitness sets. A comparison of figure 3c and 3d shows that our approach of implementing
the trade-off at the individual level results in a even smaller range of z-values that favor habitat
generalists than in the previous example.
Discussion
Genetic variation is the fuel for evolutionary change. This variation occurs at the level of
DNA sequences. The direction of evolutionary change depends on the available genetic variation
and on the per capita growth rate of the different genotypes in the environment where selection
takes place. A complete understanding of the evolutionary process would require knowledge of
how variation at the level of the DNA sequence is mapped through the process of development
to variation in demographic parameters. In most cases we are far away from such a detailed
knowledge and in order to deal with this difficulty theoretical biologists have followed either of
two different roads. Theoretical population geneticists study variation in allele space and assume
an extremely simplified genotype-phenotype map by assigning fixed fitness values to alleles. The
other approach neglects the genotype-phenotype map altogether and studies the effect of variation
directly at the level of phenotypes (optimization models, quantitative genetics, game theory, and
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adaptive dynamics). Either approach is a shortcut and it is important to develop an understanding
of the possible consequences of such shortcuts. In this paper we show how patterns of variation
and covariation at one level are mapped to a higher level and pinpoint two pitfalls that can occur
when variation at a higher level is not derived from variation in underlying traits.
Our paper is motivated by a recent series of models where habitat specific population growth is
described by either the logistic equation (Parvinen and Egas 2004; de Mazancourt and Dieckmann
2004) or the Ricker equation (Wilson and Yoshimura 1994; Egas et al. 2004). In these models
variation is implemented in habitat specific growth rates or carrying capacities. Assuming evo-
lutionary change in these population-level parameters might not be admissible for at least two
reasons. Firstly, population-level parameters that appear as independent variables in a population
dynamical equation might not be independent when derived from processes at the individual level.
Such is the case with r and K in both the logistic and the Ricker equation. In these growth models
K appears to be linearly dependent on r. Consequently, variation in r alone cannot be derived
from variation in an underlying trait. Independence of r and K should only be assumed based on a
derivation showing how different independent traits at the individual level can affect the different
demographic parameters separately. Kuno (1991), Olson (1992), and Berryman (1992) all discuss
why the logistic equation is likely to be a bad candidate to find such a derivation. Secondly, trade-
offs between population-level parameters originate from correlations in underlying individual-level
traits. If the mapping from these traits to higher level parameters is nonlinear, then specific trade-
off curvatures are not inherited from one level to the next. By implementing a certain trade-off
curvature between population-level parameters the modeler makes an implicit assumption about
the nature of the trade-off at the individual-level. Because of the involved nonlinearity this assump-
tion might often be rather unrealistic and in some cases, as we have shown, a certain curvature
cannot be derived from an underlying trade-off at all.
The observation that, based on all derivations of the logistic equation and the Ricker equation
known to us, the carrying capacity increases linearly with intrinsic growth rate, has important con-
sequences for the theory of r- and K-selection. In the classical sense, as popularized by MacArthur
and Wilson (1967), Roughgarden (1971) and Charlesworth (1971), this theory states that variable
environments where population densities are regularly set back to low values, select genotypes with
high intrinsic growth rates while more stable environments select genotypes corresponding to high
equilibrium population densities. The influential paper by Roughgarden (1971) uses the logistic
equation to derive these predictions formally. In this model a trade-off is assumed: genotypes with a
high intrinsic growth rate correspond to a low carrying capacity and vice versa. This assumption is
clearly at odds with the viewpoint championed in this paper suggesting that r and K are positively
rather than negatively correlated. Thus, in models that are based on the logistic equation but where
the demographic parameters are derived from processes at the level of the individual, selection for
high growth rates result in a concomitant increase of the carrying capacity. This point has also
been made by Kuno (1991). That the theory of r- and K-selection in its narrow sense is flawed for
other reasons is known at least since the important paper by Matessi and Gatto (1984). They have
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shown that stable environments need not select the genotype corresponding to the highest carrying
capacity but rather select the genotype that can live on the fewest resources. These authors sug-
gest to use the terms r- and K-selection to refer to the conditions of selection (density independent
vs density dependent) rather than to the outcome of selection (r-maximization vsK-maximization).
Application to the Recent Literature
The ideas presented in this paper affect the results of a recent series of papers that study
the evolution of habitat specialization. In these models mutational change is assumed for habitat-
specific carrying capacities or intrinsic growth rates.
Wilson and Yoshimura (1994) have explored the scope for coexistence of two habitat specialists
and a habitat generalist as determined by their habitat specific carrying capacities in a model where
habitat specific growth is described by the Ricker equation. In their basic model version the carrying
capacity for a specialist is ten times higher in the habitat it is adapted to when compared to the
habitat it is not adapted to. This situation corresponds to our figure 2b&d, where the two specialists
are characterized by K = (1, 0.1) and K = (0.1, 1). The shape of the trade-off is determined by
the carrying capacities of the generalist. To cover trade-off relations from strong to weak, Wilson
and Yoshimura varied the carrying capacity of the generalist between 0.3 and 0.99. Wilson and
Yoshimura (1994) find that coexistence is possible for generalists ranging from K = (0.99, 0.99)
to K = (0.4, 0.4). According to our parameterization (see eq. [13]), these generalists correspond
to trade-offs in a that are parameterized by values between z = 617 (for K = (0.99, 0.99)) and
z = 3.8 (for K = (0.4, 0.4)). Hence, all these trade-offs correspond to very weak or extremely weak
trade-offs in a (cf. fig. 2d). Moderately weak, linear and strong trade-offs in a all correspond
to strong trade-offs in K (cf. fig. 2b) and do not allow for the coexistence of two specialists and
a generalist. From this viewpoint the scope for coexistence seems to be far more restricted than
suggested by Wilson and Yoshimura.
Egas et al. (2004) present a re-analysis of the model of Wilson and Yoshimura. In one version
of their model they assume that the habitat-specific carrying capacities can vary continuously
between zero and 100. A carrying capacity of zero corresponds to an infinitely large competition
neighborhood size with aimax =∞ = aivar. In appendix B we prove that in this case any trade-off
in a is mapped into a strong trade-off in K. However, from the analysis in Egas et al. (2004) it
becomes clear that coexistence of two specialists and a generalists requires a weak trade-off inK in
all cases where environmental variability is not extremely high. This perspective therefore suggests
again that coexistence is far more restricted than it appears from the analysis of the authors.
Parvinen and Egas (2004) studied the evolution of habitat specialization in a metapopulation
model with two types of habitat and logistic growth within patches. Evolutionary change is assumed
in either habitat-specific intrinsic growth rates or carrying capacities. Currently no derivation of
the logistic equation known to us provides a mechanism that would allow to vary the intrinsic
growth rate while leaving the carrying capacities constant: in all published mechanisms known to
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us the latter is linearly dependent on the former. Hence, we lack an individual-based interpretation
of habitat specialization in terms of intrinsic growth rates.
The main purpose of a paper by de Mazancourt and Dieckmann (2004) is to extend Levins’
(1962) graphical fitness set approach to accommodate frequency-dependent selection. In order to
illustrate their methodology they analyze a model of one consumer feeding in two habitats. The
consumer grows logistically in each habitat and evolves in a trait that determines habitat-specific
carrying capacities. Evolution in the carrying capacities is assumed to be constrained by a trade-off
and in the specific case analyzed by de Mazancourt and Dieckmann (2004) the space of possible
carrying capacities ranges from 0 to 10. As mentioned above, no individual-based derivation of
the logistic equation is known to us that can produce a weak trade-off in K for this choice of
parameters. Since a weak trade-off is a prerequisite for evolutionary branching in their model,
this seems, at least from the viewpoint of individual-level traits, contrary to the statement of the
authors, a very unlikely outcome. We want to emphasize that our objection against the specific
example does not detract from the eminent suitability of their methodology for analyzing situations
where little knowledge is available on the mapping from individual-level traits to population-level
parameters. An analysis along their lines produces graphical conditions that a trade-off curve has
to fulfill for a specific outcome to be realized.
Ultimately the nature of variation at any given level is an empirical question and it might very
well be that in a certain species a pattern of variation is found that matches the assumed variation
in the above mentioned studies without that this pattern is derived from considerations at the
level of the individual. Therefore, theoretical studies of an a priori chosen pattern of variation in
population-level parameters without deriving it from an underlying level can still be useful. How-
ever, such a match would seem to be a lucky coincidence and should not form the basis of a research
program. Instead, we suggest the following approach. Evolutionary predictions should be derived
from models that assume evolutionary change at the level of individual-based traits. In order to
get a broader picture one should get a collection of different individual-based derivations. In a
second step one can classify the traits occurring in these derivations with respect to how variation
at this level is mapped to the level of demographic traits and therefore result in the same class of
evolutionary dynamics.
The Evolution of Resource Specialization
Finally we want to draw attention to the results of our evolutionary analysis as such. In
the face of trade-offs, theory predicts two qualitatively different evolutionary outcomes. Natural
selection can either lead towards an intermediate phenotype where the gain from improving one
trait is exactly balanced by the loss through the accompanying change in another trait or to an
extreme phenotype at the boundary of the trait space. The evolution of habitat specialization in
terms of the size of the interaction neighborhood a shows a marked difference in the continuous
and the discrete time model. In the continuous time model, where fast migration between habitats
is assumed, the generalist is selected for in case of weak trade-offs, while specialists are selected
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for in case of strong trade-offs. This scenario coincides with the intuition of many evolutionary
ecologists about the evolution of resource specialization (e.g., Benkman 1993; Robinson 2000) and
with Levins’ predictions for evolution in an environment stable in time but heterogeneous in space
(Levins 1962). By contrast, in the discrete time model, where juvenile dispersal and no migration is
assumed, specialists are also selected for in combination with weak trade-offs. This scenario shows
that Levins’ result does not hold generally but only when fitness is a linear function of the traits
considered evolvable.
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Appendix A: Fast Migration Between Habitats
The population dynamics of one consumer species exploiting two different habitats can be
described by the following system of coupled differential equations:
dN1
dt
= m12N2
A2
A1
−m21N1 + b1N1 − d1N1 (A1)
dN2
dt
= m21N1
A1
A2
−m12N2 + b2N2 − d2N2. (A2)
N1 and N2 denote the population density in habitat one and two, respectively. Individuals migrate
at rate mij from habitat j to habitat i. Absolute habitat size is denoted by Ai. In each habitat
individuals reproduce and die at the habitat-specific rates bi and di, respectively. If we assume that
migration rates are high in comparison to the birth and death rates, we can calculate the equilibrium
distribution of the population over the two habitats as Nˆ1 = Nˆ2A2m12/A1m21. Combining this
with n = A1N1 + A2N2, where n denotes the total population size, we find that p1 = A1Nˆ1/nˆ =
m12/(m21 +m12) and p2 = A2Nˆ2/nˆ = m21/(m21 +m12).
In order to write the model purely in terms of individual-level traits, we assume that the
habitat-specific death rates increase linearly with the number of competitors and that therefore
the realized rate of increase of a consumer with n competitors in its competition neighborhood of
size a is given by rn = b0 − (d0 + ln). Here l is a positive constant. It describes the sensitivity
to competition such that the sensitivity is increasing with increasing values of l. If we substitute
r0 for b0 − d0 we can rewrite the realized rate of increase as rn = r0 − ln. The expected rate of
increase is then given by
E[r] = r0 − l
∑
n
nP (n) = r0 − ln¯ = r0 − lNa = r0
(
1−
laN
r0
)
, (A3)
i.e., K = r0/la.
Appendix B: Mapping of the Trade-Off
Consider a trade-off between a1 and a2 that can be described by the function a2(a1). This
trade-off curve is translated into a curve K2(K1) by the map K2(a2(a1(K1))). This map has to be
derived from equation (12) and (10) or (11). To study the curvature of the trade-off in K, we have
to differentiate K2(a2(a1(K1))) twice:
d2K2(a2(a1(K1)))
dK2
1
∝ 2
da2
da1
(
da2
da1
1
a2
−
1
a1
)
−
d2a2
da2
1
. (B1)
This gives us an expression for the shape of the trade-off in terms of the first two derivatives of
a2(a1). Further analytical results can be obtained for specific parameterizations of the trade-off
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curve. Here we choose equation (12) which can also be written as
1 =
(
a1max − a1
a1var
)z
+
(
a2max − a2
a2var
)z
. (B2)
We can derive the trade-off function a2(a1) by solving equation (B2) for a2. The first two derivatives
of this function can be simplified using equation (12) and equation(B2) to:
da2
da1
= −
(1− θ)θ
1
z a2var
(1− θ)
1
z θa1var
and
d2a2
da2
1
=
(1− θ)θ
1
z a2var(z − 1)
(1− θ)
2
z θ2a2
1var
. (B3)
Now we are able to simplify condition (B1) using equation (B3):
d2K2(a2(a1(K1)))
dK2
1
∝ 1− z + 2
[
θ
a1var(1− θ)
1
z
a1max − a1var(1− θ)
1
z
+ (1− θ)
a2varθ
1
z
a2max − a2varθ
1
z
]
(B4)
This condition depends on the magnitude of z relative to 1 plus two times some complicated
expression in brackets. If both aivar are small, then the term in brackets is small as well, and the
sign of the second derivative will be determined by the difference between 1 and z. In this case,
whether K2(a2(a1(K1))) is a strong or a weak trade-off is inherited for most values of z from the
corresponding property in the underlying trade-off a2(a1). By contrast, if both aivar are large, i.e.,
very similar to aimax, then the term in brackets will be large as well and can dominate the whole
expression. In this case moderately weak trade-offs in a will be mapped into strong trade-offs in
K. When aivar approaches infinity, that is, when Kimin approaches zero, then K2(K1) will be a
convex trade-off for any value of z.
Appendix C: Analytical Results for Evolutionary Analysis
First we present some analytical results for the case of fast migration and mutational change
in K. These derivations are very similar to those in appendix B and will not be repeated in as
much detail. The optimization criterion is given by Nˆ (eq. 4). Differentiating Nˆ with respect
to K1 (where K2 is considered a function of K1) reveals that critical points of Nˆ are given by
dK2/dK1 = −(p
2
1r1K
2
2 )/(p
2
2r2K
2
1 ). To see whether these critical points are maxima or minima of
Nˆ we need to differentiate Nˆ twice. It appears that we get a more tractable result if we differentiate
Nˆ ′ := −1/Nˆ , an expression that has minima and maxima for the same values as Nˆ . Differentiating
Nˆ ′ twice with respect yields
d2Nˆ ′
dK2
1
=
p22r2
K2
2
d2K2
dK2
1
−
2p21r1
K3
1
−
2p22r2
K3
2
(
dK2
dK1
)2
. (C1)
When we evaluate this derivative a the critical points of Nˆ we can replace the middle term with
−(dK2/dK1)2r2p
2
2/(K
2
2K1). This allows us factor out p2r2/K
2
2 from the right hand side of equation
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(C1). After replacing dK2/dK1 and d
2K2/dK
2
1 with their explicit expressions, which can be derived
analogous to equation (B3), we get
d2Nˆ ′
dK2
1
∝ 1− z − 2
(
θ
K1var(1− θ)
1
z
K1min +K1var(1− θ)
1
z
+ (1− θ)
K2varθ
1
z
K2min +K2varθ
1
z
)
. (C2)
For z > 1 (weak trade-offs) this expression is always negative and therefore critical points are
maxima. For z < 1 the sign of expression (C2) depends on the term in brackets. When this term
is larger than 0.5, then d2Nˆ ′/dK21 will be negative for any value of z and the critical point will be
again a maximum. This is the case when the Kimin’s are sufficiently small. In case of symmetric
parameter values for r, p,Kmin,Kmax, we find a critical point of the optimization criterion at θ = 0.5.
A sufficient condition for d2Nˆ ′/dK21 to be negative is then given by Kmin < Kvar0.5
1
z . However,
when both Kivar are sufficiently small, then the term in brackets will be close to zero and the
difference between one and z dominates the term in brackets. The optimization criterion has then
the same qualitative curvature as the trade-off K2(K1). In the limit Kivar = 0, the term in brackets
becomes zero and a strong trade-off in K corresponds to a minimum in Nˆ and a weak trade-off in
K corresponds to a maximum in Nˆ .
For the model with juvenile dispersal and symmetric parameter values (p1 = 1/2 = p2, r1 =
r = r2, K1min = K2min, K1var = K2var, a1max = a2max, a1var = a2var, R01 = R02, k1 = k = k2)
we can prove that the bifurcation from a repelling generalist to a generalist that is a CSS occurs
for z < 1 when the trade-off is directly in K, and for z > 1 when the trade-off is in a. Under the
assumption of symmetry the first derivative of the fitness function (eq. [16] and eq. [17]) equals
zero at the generalists trait where K1 = K = K2 and a1 = a = a2, respectively. At these trait
values dK2/dK1 = −1 and Nˆ = 2K in case of a trade-off directly in K and da2/da1 = −1 and
Nˆ = 2r/(a(1−k)) in case of a trade-off in a. The bifurcation point is given by the z-value where the
second derivative of the fitness function (eq. [16] and eq. [17]) equals zero: d2w(K ′,K)/dK ′21 = 0
and d2w(a′,a)/da′21 = 0, respectively. Under the above mentioned conditions we can derive that
the bifurcation points are characterized by
d2K2/dK
2
1 = 2(2− r)/K (C3)
and
d2a2/da
2
1 = 2r/a, (C4)
respectively. The right hand side of eq. (C3) is positive for r < 2. Hence, for stable population
dynamical equilibria the bifurcation occurs for a convex trade-off inK. As explained in the section
on the mapping of trade-offs, this corresponds to a strong trade-off in K (z < 1). The right hand
side of eq. (C4) is also a positive number, thus, indicating again that the bifurcation occurs for
a convex trade-off. However, for this case where the trade-off is assumed in a, a convex trade-off
corresponds to a weak trade-off (z > 1).
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Figure Legends
Fig. 1.— Distribution of phenotypes in the two-dimensional (α1, α2)-trait space. Solid lines corre-
spond to a constraint or trade-off beyond which no viable phenotypes can occur. Since fitness is
decreasing in both α1 and α2 the set of possible phenotypes lies above and to the right of the con-
straint. The right panel shows the location of the phenotypes and the constraint after applying the
mapping (α1, α2) 7→ ((b1 − d1)/α1, (b2 − d2)/α2) = (K1,K2). Because fitness is increasing in both
K1 and K2 the distribution of phenotypes lie below and to the left of the constraint. Note that the
trade-off has changed from weak to strong (see text for further explanation). In the (α1, α2)-space
the phenotypes have relative low values for both habitats, indicating a high degree of adaptation,
while in the (K1,K2)-space the phenotypes again correspond to low values, now indicating a low
degree of adaptation. Parameter values are chosen such that bi − di = 1.
Fig. 2.— Mapping of five different trade-off curves for the habitat-specific size of competition
neighborhoods ai onto trade-off in carrying capacities Ki through function given by equation (10)
(a & b), and vice versa through the inverse function (c & d). The left graph in each pair shows trade-
offs for five values of the curvature parameter z before the application of the mapping while the right
graph shows trade-offs as a result of the mapping. Curves with the same gray scale correspond to
the same value of z ∈ {4, 2, 1, 0.5, 0.25} with z decreasing with lighter coloration. Other parameters:
b = (0.3, 0.3), d = (0.1, 0.1), p = (0.5, 0.5), (a) amax = (0.2, 0.2), avar = (0.1, 0.1), l = (10, 10), (b)
amax = (1, 1), avar = (0.9, 0.9), l = (2, 2), (c) Kmin = (0.1, 0.1), Kvar = (0.1, 0.1), l = (10, 10), (d)
Kmin = (0.1, 0.1), Kvar = (0.9, 0.9), l = (2, 2).
Fig. 3.— Bifurcation diagram of extrema of optimization criterion as a function of curvature
parameter z for model with: (a & b) fast migration between habitats (logistic equation), (c & d)
juvenile dispersal (Ricker equation). Ordinate shows value of the specialization coefficient θ. (a &
c) Trade-off directly in K. (b & d) Trade-off in a. Solid lines indicate maxima of the optimization
criterion and correspond to CSSs while dashed lines indicate minima of the optimization criterion
and correspond to evolutionary repellors. The gray vertical line in (b) indicates that for θ = 1
all trait combination are selectively neutral. Arrows indicate the direction of evolutionary change.
Parameter values: p = (0.5, 0.5), (a & c) Kmin = (0.1, 0.1), Kvar = (0.4, 0.4), r = (0.2, 0.2), (b &
d) amax = (0.5, 0.5), avar = (0.4, 0.4), l = (4, 4), (b) l = (4, 4), b = (0.3, 0.3), d = (0.1, 0.1), (d)
k = (0.1, 0.1), logR0 = (0.2, 0.2).
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Fig. 4.— Fitness contour plots for model with: (a-c) fast migration between habitats (logistic
equation) and (d-f) juvenile dispersal (Ricker equation). Fitness contours represent values of op-
timization criteria as function of K1 and K2 (a, c, d, f) or a1 and a2 (b, e). Lighter coloration
indicates higher values of the optimization criterion and therefore higher fitness. Trade-offs with
different values of the curvature parameter z are plotted on top of the fitness landscape. For a
given trade-off curve the optimal phenotype is given by the point on the trade-off curve lying on
the highest contour. The color of the circles at the position of the habitat generalist indicates evo-
lutionary properties: black circle = CSS, white circle = repellor, gray circle = selectively neutral
with respect to all other traits on the trade-off. In (a & d) the trade-off is assumed directly in K.
In (b & e) the trade-off is assumed in a. In (c & f) the trade-off inK is derived from the underlying
trade-off in a. These latter two representations necessarily give the same result. Parameter values
as in figure 3.
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